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I. TARGET SYSTEM
ARGET of the model is a representation of territorial
conflicts and conflict resolution in Mafia Type
Organizations (MTO) [1]. Prime example is the Sicilian
Cosa Nostra. The business activity of MTOs is systematic
extortion of economic actors. Thereby an MTO controls a
territory in a monopolistic way. Typically it offers services,
most likely protection, in return and establishes a quasi-
political authority over a territory. For instance, the
collective organization of the Cosa Nostra controlled most of
Sicily, at least the city of Palermo, in the times of its
maximum power [2,3]. Currently the power of the political
authority of the Cosa Nostra is in decline [4]. However, the
control is divided in a number of territories which are
controlled by different so-called families of the Mafia. These
territories are denoted as Mandamento. The families are
subdivisions of the organization which have a considerable
amount of freedom of action [5]. It is a norm of the Cosa
Nostra that a territory which is extorted by one family shall
not be extorted by other families.
Internally an MTO is a professional organization, constituted
as a strict hierarchy. It has to be noted, however, that the
leadership style varies between history and different leaders.
At the top is commission, the so-called cupola. The cupola
coordinates activities of the Mafia families and resolves
conflicts. While at the times of its constitution it was a rather
democratic commission of bosses of the families, it was
often likely to be dominated by one boss (the ‘godfather’) of
the Mafia, who may be assisted by advisors [6,7]. Moreover
an interprovincial commission had been established in the
1970s which formally is above the cupola. However, in
practice it was dominated by the commission of Palermo [6].
The families are governed by a capo di famiglia, at the
bottom level of the hierarchy are the so-called soldiers which
undertake everyday business [6].
However, the structure of the organization remains fragile,
dependent on mutual commitment of the influential capos to
the organizational status quo. The history of the Cosa Nostra
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is characterized by Mafia wars in the early 1960s (with an
additional peak of violence in 1969) and early 1980s.
Essentially the wars were power struggles between rivaling
families. The war in the 1960s broke out when drugs got lost
and a certain Mafiosi had been accused of being guilty. The
case came up for trial at the cupola. He was discharged, but
nevertheless been killed by other Mafiosi. This undermined
the monopoly of violence of the cupola and became starting
point for violent conflicts [6].
II. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The specific target of the model is stylized fact
representation of the internal conflict resolution within the
organization and its collapse in Mafia wars.
• Research question a) is the analysis of the micro
mechanisms of stability by a stylized fact representation
of the internal conflict resolution within the
organization.
• Research question b) is the analysis of the micro
mechanisms of the collapse of organizational stability in
so-called Mafia wars.
• Research question c) is to investigate whether patterns
in the outbreak of violence can be detected that
characterize the organization as semi-stable system.
External relations of the MTO such as extortion and the
control over a territory are treated as given facts. Shops pay
unconditionally, representing an unquestioned authority of
the MTO over the territory. Likewise, historical contingency
such as different styles of leadership are not represented.
III. ATTRIBUTES OF THE MODEL
The simulated organization operates in a world divided in
territories of different ‘families’. The world is scattered with
shops which provide the revenues for the organization. The
model applies a stylised fact simulation to investigate effects
of basic mechanisms. Space is restricted to a square which
can in later stages be extended by a GIS interface of the
territories of the Cosa Nostra clans in the city of Palermo.
Soldiers and shops are placed randomly over the territory.
The capo is placed in the middle of its territory.   
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Fig. 1: The world. Different colors represent territories. The black stars
represent shops. Big colored triangles are the capos, placed in the centre of
their territory. Small colored triangles represent the soldiers, placed
randomly in the world.
The MTO has a hierarchical structure: The bottom level of a
family of the MTO consists of soldiers which undertake the
extortion of the shops. A family is directed by a ‘capo di
familglia’, i.e. the boss of a family. These are the hierarchy
levels of the sub-divisions of the organization, the families.
The capo knows the borders of his territory, the soldiers not.
This is the most simple assumption that soldier’s extortion is
only tamed by sanctions. Different territories are represented
by different colors. Furthermore a top hierarchy level of the
overall organization represents the Mafia commission
(cupola). This top level of the hierarchy above the single
families is intended to resolve conflicts between families.
For simplicity, one capo is selected randomly as the boss at
the top level in the model. Political processes of power
balance [6] are not represented. This agent has two roles: the
role of a capo with a certain territory and the role of the boss
(the ‘godfather’) of the overall organization of the MTO.
Moreover, each agent belongs to a family, which is publicly
known and has a private list of friends. Friendship is
reciprocal and not distributed along the line of the families
or hierarchy levels. This is justified by the fact that Mafia
members have friendship ties across families which became
an important factor in the Mafia war in the 1980s by soldiers
secretly changing sides. The friendship entails a differential
degree of loyalty in case of conflicting demands.
IV. SCHEDULING
The implementation of the model follows a sequential
approach: first a simple model of ‘ordinary conflict
resolution’ has been implemented which provides the basis
for an extension to include Mafia wars, i.e. first research
question a) is investigated.
The process of extortion is not modeled explicitly. Soldiers
walk randomly over the world. If they enter a patch with a
shop they extort the shop with a certain degree of likelihood.
If they extort, they gain a certain amount of extortion money
from the shop. This handed over to the capo who
periodically distributes the periodic income to his soldiers,
while keeping a certain amount for himself.
In the initializing phase the soldiers learn to extort only
inside their territory. If a soldier extorts a shop in the
territory of a different family the capo sanctions the soldier.
This decreases the probability that the soldier will extort a
shop in the territory of this family. The action of the capo is
guided by the norm ‘not to extort in foreign territories’. The
decision process of the capo is represented by the follow:
if
mysoldier(ID-soldier)extorts
shop(ID-shop)
and (ID-shop) not in list(myshops)
then
if random-number < sanction-
probability
sanction mysoldier(ID-soldier)
However, the norm is only imperfectly realized. If the
income falls below a capo’s threshold of satisfaction, it
terminates sanctioning. In the absence of sanctions the
soldier gradually forgets the norm and starts again extorting
in foreign territories. At this stage the conflict resolution by
the top hierarchy level becomes effective. The exploited
capo complains against the exploiter. The complaint is sent
to the ‘godfather’, who sanctions the deviant capo. In turn,
this sanction increases the likelihood that the deviant capo
will continue sanctioning its soldiers. This is the process of
ordinary conflict resolution in the hierarchical organization.
However, it is an empirical fact that conflict resolution
remains precarious and might fail. This leads to the outbreak
of a Mafia war. The extension of the model to include Mafia
wars is work in progress. If one of the capos constantly
violates the organizational norms to a much larger degree
than the other capos, a plan can made to murder the deviant
capo with a certain degree of likelihood. The plan can be
made by the top level boss or that capo which is mostly
exploited. Also the deviant capo knows that it is in danger
and might plan to murder the most likely aggressor in
advance. Plans to murder are sent within the friendship
network. However, it might be the case that one of the
receivers of the plan has a friendship relation to the potential
victim, leading to a situation of conflicting loyalties. The
agent decides between two possibilities: participate at the
murder or betray the conspirator. If the potential victim gets
informed it generates in turn a plan of murdering the
conspirator. This plan is again distributed in the friendship
network of this agent [8].
Condition for the decision who initiates a war is the relative
strength of the families. Strength is measured by the number
of soldier. Soldiers may decide to change to another family
dependent on the perceived strength of the capo. If they
migrate they increase the strength of their new family.
However, also the revenues need to be shared among a
greater number of family members. This is an incentive to
exploit new sources of income, whereas the increase in the
relative strength makes it likely to win a war to gain access
Miguel, Amblard, Barceló & Madella (eds.) Advances in Computational Social Science and Social Simulation
Barcelona: Autònoma University of Barcelona, 2014, DDD repository <http://ddd.uab.cat/record/125597>
to new sources of income by subordinating a territory. The
murder of a capo triggers a power struggle between the
soldiers. If a soldier which changed the sides becomes the
new capo it subordinates this family to the other family. In
this case the winning family controls the territory of the
assassinated capo.
V. PRELIMINARY RESULTS
First simulation experiments with ordinary conflict
resolution, i.e. sanctions by the mandamento for deviant
capos verify that the model works as intended.
• Increasing the number of shops increases the revenue of
the families. This decreases norm violation.
• Varying the probability with which the capo sanctions
extortion of his soldiers in foreign territories reveals that
this parameter determines the speed with which the
soldiers learn the border of the territory.
• If the average income of the capos is above but near
their threshold of satisfaction the capos start to deviate
from the norm to respect the territories of the families
because of the variance of the revenues. This triggers
conflict escalation towards Mafia wars.
For the purpose of an extended abstract this will only be
illustrated by one example of a graphical display of the
results (see Fig. 2).
Fig. 2: Sanctions of the godfather to deviant capos. It can be seen that the
capo of the red Mandamento (i.e. territory) constantly receives more
sanctions than the other capos. This makes it likely that it will be a main
actor in next war.
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